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A NEW VIEW, OR JUST BEING DIFFICULT?
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S VIEW ON CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS
Sierra Club v. Bosworth'
I. INTRODUCTION
Circuit splits can be one of the most frustrating and complicated
matters the courts face today. However, it is rare and interesting to see
how a new circuit split on an issue begins. The Ninth Circuit has created
an unfortunate split of appellate authority in its recent interpretation of the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), specifically section 1508.4
which governs categorical exclusions. In the instant case, Sierra Club v.
Bosworth, the Ninth Circuit decided that before promulgating a categorical
exclusion under NEPA, an environmental assessment must be conducted
to determine whether the agency action will have a significant effect on
the human environment, and if an environmental impact statement is
needed because there is a significant effect. However, the text of the
NEPA regulations would seem to render such action unnecessary, because
the statutory definition of a "categorical exclusion" states that actions in
excluded categories do not have a significant effect. Obviously, the
Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue, but the Seventh Circuit
decided on this issue a few years ago. It held that categorical exclusions
do not have enough of an effect on the human environment to invoke the
production of an environmental assessment. The Ninth Circuit has erred
by not examining closer the reasoning used by its fellow Circuit Court on
the same issue and has held the opposite in this instant case. This note
will explore the Ninth Circuit reasoning for its decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The appellants involved in this case are the Sierra Club and the
Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign.2 The appellees are the United
' 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007).
2 Id. at 1018.
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States Forest Service and Department of Agriculture.3 The Sierra Club
sued the Forest Service, alleging that the Forest Service violated the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").4 The main issue here was
the Forest Service's establishment of a NEPA categorical exclusion, the
Fuels Categorical Exclusion ("Fuels CE") for fuel reduction projects up to
1,000 acres and prescribed bum projects up to 4,500 acres on all national
forests in the United States. 5
The facts of this case began as early as 2002.6 The Deputy Chief
of the Forest Service declared intentions to establish a fuels categorical
exclusion for fuels reduction activities on national forest land.7 Along
with this announcement, the Deputy Chief also requested data from all
Regional Foresters regarding fuels treatment projects.8  The data call
collected "2,500 hazardous fuels reduction and rehabilitation/stabilization
projects involving treatment of more than 2,500,000 acres."9 By the end
of 2002, the Forest Service gave public notice and requested comments on
the proposed Fuels CE.10 Approximately 39,000 comments were received
on the Fuels CE."
The Sierra Club filed this suit challenging the Fuels CE and sought
an injunction enjoining the Fuels CE nationwide.12  The Sierra Club
claimed that the Fuels CE is invalid for the following reasons: "(1) the
categorical exclusion inappropriately included activities that have
significant effects; (2) data underlying the Fuels categorical exclusion did
not support promulgation of the categorical exclusion; (3) the Forest
Service did not adequately identify activities covered by the categorical
exclusion; and (4) the Forest Service did not adequately determine there
3id.
4 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370f (2000)).




1o Id.; see also See 76 Fed. Reg. at 77038.
11 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1019.
12 1d. at 1018.
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were no 'extraordinary circumstances' under which the categorical
exclusion would not be appropriate."' 3
The Sierra Club also claimed that the Forest Service violated
NEPA by not preparing an Environmental Assessment ("EA")/Finding of
No Significant Impact ("FONSI") or an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for the Fuels categorical exclusion.14  In the instant case, the
Sierra Club challenged the Fuels CE for three specific national forest
projects. 1
One of the main arguments that the Sierra Club makes is that the
Fuels CE required an EIS or an EA/FONSI because the categorical
exclusion is a "major federal action"l 6 that has a significant impact on the
environment. 17  The Sierra Club argued that the Fuels CE is a major
13 Id. at 1021-22.14 Id. at 1022.
15 Id. at 1021. The projects were scheduled for 2004 in Eldorado
National Forest-the Grey Eagle Fuels Reduction Project (logging 984
acres and prescribed burning 4.149 acres), the Forests Guard Fuels
Reduction Project (logging and prescribing burning 412 acres), and the
Rockeye Fuels Reduction Project (logging and prescribing burning 513
acres). Id. The Sierra Club withdrew its motion to challenge the fourth
project because the Forest Service decided not to continue with the
project. Id. The most recent schedule of proposed actions show that
the Forest Service has 15 or more Fuels CEs planned for the Eldorado
National Forest, which would cover more than 8,000 acres. Id. See
also Schedule of Proposed Action 4-1-2007-6-30-2007 Eldorado
National Forest, available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/sopa/components/reports/sopa- 110503-2007-
04.pdf. The Forest Service also has Fuels CEs planned for the Lassen
National Forest. Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1021 The Sierra Club
continues the challenge the Fuel's CE for those projects on this appeal
as well. Id.
16 The Regulations define a major federal action as actions with effects
that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control
and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not have a meaning
independent of significantly. 40 C.F.R. 1508.27 (2000). Actions
include the circumstance where the responsible officials fail to act and
that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals
under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as
aency action. 40 C.F.R. 1508.18 (2000).
"Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1024, 1024. See also 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (2000).
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federal action because it is a rule.' 8  The Council of Environmental
Quality ("CEQ") regulations say that federal actions include "new or
revised agency rules, regulations, plans, polices or procedures; and
legislative proposals."l 9 Alternatively, the Sierra Club argues that even if
the Fuels CE does not qualify as a rule, it would still qualify as a major
federal action because it meets the definition of a "program" under the
regulations. 20
However, the defense relied on CEQ regulations which state
categorical exclusions do not have a significant impact on the
environment.21 The Forest Service also relied on the Seventh Circuit
decision in Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service22 on this issue,
which was discussed in great detail by the district court. 23
In addition, the district court also relied on that court's statement
that the "CEQ promulgated a rule requiring agencies to establish 'agency
Id. at 1025. The Administrative Procedure Act defines a rule as ... the whole or a part
of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure,
or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefore or of valuations, costs, or
accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 5. U.S.C. §551(4) (2000).
9 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2008).
20 Id. "Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a
specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency
resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18(b)(3) (2008).
21 Id. The flaw in the Sierra Club's argument is that a categorical
exclusion is by definition not a major federal action because the CEQ
regulations define it to be 'a category of actions which do not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment and which have been found to have no such effect.' The
CEQ regulations also explicitly state that for this 'category of actions,"
no EIS or EA is required. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2008)).
22 Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000).
23 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1022. In Heartwood, Inc., an environmental group brought
suit against the United States Forest Service alleging that the Service's promulgation of
categorical exclusions violated NEPA. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the creation of
new categorical exclusions is an agency procedure and that those exclusions are not
proposed actions, but rather categories of actions that do not necessitate an EA or EIS.
Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 230 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2000). Id.
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procedures' that included 'specific criteria for and identification of those
typical classes of action...which normally do not require either an
environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment,' in other
words, procedures to establish [categorical exclusions]."24 Pursuant to 40
C.F.R. §1508.4, categorical exclusions are a category of actions that have
not been found to have a significant effect on the environment. 25  The
Seventh Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court case Andres v. Sierra
Club26 where the Court indicated great deference must be given to the
CEQ's interpretation of its regulations. 27 Thus, because the CEQ does not
require agencies to conduct an EA before promulgating a new categorical
exclusion, one is not needed.28 The CEQ regulations specifically state that
agency procedures have to comply with the regulations that include
''specific criteria for and identification of those typical classes of
action...which do not require environmental impact statements or an
environmental assessment." 29 The regulations only require each agency to
"consult with the Council [CEQ] while developing its procedures and
before publishing them in the Federal Register for comment." 30 Also, it is
not a change in the Forest Service's policy to not produce an EIS or EA
prior to the promulgation of a categorical exclusion. 31 Another significant
point to discuss is that the Sierra Club argued that EIS's have been
required for rules and regulations for over 20 years, it cannot point to any
prior instance where an agency produced an EA/FONSI along with the
promulgation of a new categorical exclusion. 32
Using all of the facts and legal theory discussed above, the District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. 33 The
24 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1025 (quoting 40 C.F.R. §1507.3 (2008)).
25 Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
26 Andres v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).27 Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954; see also Andrus, 442 U.S. 347, 358.28 Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954.
29 40 C.F.R. §l507.3(b)(2)(ii) (2008).
30 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (2008).
31 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1026.
32 Id. See e.g., Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Service, 435 F.3d 1204, 1211-14 (10th Cir.
2006); see also Cellular Phone Task Force v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 205 F.3d 82, 94-
95; see also Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954.
3 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1021. In the same ruling, the District Court also allowed
Sierra Club's motion to add it declarations from three of their experts. Id.
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District Court relied on Seventh Circuit's authority in Heartwood4 which
held that the Forest Service was not required to make an EIS or
EA/FONSI before promulgating a categorical exclusion.3 5  The District
Court also found that the Sierra Club had not proved that the Forest
Service's Xrocedures were irrational or had misplaced reliance on expert
opinions. The court also determined that the Forest Service had
"adequately determined and documented that no extraordinary
circumstances existed in the four projects which would trigger the
requirement for an EA or EIS and that the proposed fuels treatment did not
* - 37increase fire risk.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded this decision.38  The
court stated that the Forest Service failed to prove that it made a
reasonable decision to promulgate the Fuels CE, thus making the
promulgation arbitrary and capricious. 39 When the Forest Service stated
that no significant environmental effects were likely to result, without
complying with NEPA requirement, the Forest Service made a "clear error
of judgment."40
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act 41 was enacted into law in
1970.42 The purpose of NEPA is to establish national environmental
34 Id.; See also Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 955.
3s Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1025. Accordingly, the one court to address
this issue, the Seventh Circuit in Heartwood, determined that because
categorical exclusions 'by definition, do not have a significant effect on
the quality of the human environment,' the promulgation of a new
categorical exclusion does not require issuance of an EIS or an
EA/FONSI.' Id. (quoting Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954).
36 Id. at 1022.
37 id.
38 Id. at 1034.
39 Id. at 1026 (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).
40 Id. at 1032 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. 360 at 378 (1989)).
41 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
42 id.
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policy and goals for "the protection, maintenance, and enhancement of the
environment." 43 NEPA also developed a process for implementing the set
goals along with the Council on Environmental Quality." The
Declaration of National Environmental Policy is in Title I of NEPA.45
Specifically, the policy "requires federal agencies to incorporate
environmental considerations in their planning and decision-making
through a systematic interdisciplinary approach."46 Federal agencies are
required to prepare detailed statements, known as Environmental Impact
Statements ("EISs"), that assess the impact on the environment and
alternatives to any major federal action that significantly affect the
environment. 47  Title II established the Council on Environmental
Quality. 4 8 The CEQ is established within the Executive branch as part of
NEPA with responsibilities provided by the Environmental Quality
Improvement act of 1970 as well as NEPA. 49 The CEQ is in charge of
ensuring that federal agencies meet their obligations under NEPA.so
NEPA does not mandate specific results, but it is a procedural
statue that provides the necessary process for federal agencies to take a
"hard look at the environmental consequences of their actions."si In order
to meet this "hard look" requirement, NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and.other major




45 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000)
46 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Basic Information,
(NEPA),http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/basics/nepa.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
47 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
48 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/basics/nepa.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
49 The White House, Council on Environmental Quality,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/aboutceq.html (last visited on Nov. 24, 2008).
50 Id. "The Challenge of harmonizing our economic, environmental and social aspirations
ahs put NEPA at the forefront of our nation's efforts to protect the environment." Id.
s' Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Neighbors of
Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002)).5 2 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000)).
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According to the CEQ regulations, an agency may prepare an EA
to "determine whether the environmental impact of the proposed action is
significant enough to warrant an EIS."53 An EIS must be prepared if an
EA establishes that the agency's pro osed action "may have a significant
effect upon the... environment..." If the EA establishes that the
agency's proposed action does not have a significant effect on the
environment, the agency must issue a finding of no significant impact (a
"FONSI") along with a statement of reasons to explain why there is not
significant effect." However, neither an EIS nor an EA is necessary if the
agency's proposed action falls under a categorical exclusion.56 "Pursuant
to CEQ regulations, each agency is required to identify categories of
actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect
on the human environment." 57 The categorical exclusion procedures also
provide for certain circumstances where a normally excluded action may
have a significant environmental effect, in which case an EIS or an
EA/FONSI will be required.
On August 22, 2002, President Bush announced on the Healthy
Forests Initiative.59 The Initiative ordered the Departments of Agriculture
and Interior and the CEQ "to improve regulatory processes to ensure more
timely decisions, greater efficiency, and better results in reducing the risk
of catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health.".60 In light of the
Healthy Forests Initiative, the Forest Service developed the Fuels
s Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2008); Nat'1 Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d
722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001).
54 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2008)).
55Id
56 Id. (citing Alaska Ctr. For the Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 853-54 (9th
Cir.1999).
571d. at 1019 (quoting Alaska Ctr. for the Env't, 189 F.3d at 853-54).
58Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007)).
s9ld. See National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire
Management Activities, Categorical Exclusions, 67 Fed. Reg. 77038, 77039 (Dec. 16,
2002) (codified at Forest Service Handbook 1909.15, ch. 30, §31.2(10) (2004)).
6 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1019. The Initiative was induced by 2000 fire season, one of
the worst fire seasons in 50 years. Id. There were 123,000 fires that burned more than
8.4 million acres. Id. This was twice the national average for the past 10 previous years.
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categorical exclusion. 6 1 "The Fuels categorical exclusion is designed to
reduce and thin hazardous fuels, which are 'combustible vegetation (live
or dead), such as grass, leaves, ground litter, plants shrubs, and trees, that
contribute to the threat of ignition and high fire intensity and/or high rate
of spread."' 62 The Fuels CE includes "hazardous fuels reduction activities
using prescribed fire, not to exceed 4,500 acres, and mechanical methods
for crushing, piling, thinning, prunin , cutting, chipping, mulching and
mowing, not to exceed 1,000 acres."6 If a proposed project falls under
the Fuels categorical exclusion, there must be a project file that explains
why the project is excluded and an explanation why no extraordinary
circumstances exist." Preceding the Fuels CE, the Forest Service
Handbook ("FSH") added language in the extraordinary circumstances
section that allowed an action to continue under a categorical exclusion
even though a listed resource condition exists.65 The 1992 Forest Service
guidance had given a non-exhaustive list of extraordinary circumstances.66
However, now the factors on this non-exhaustive list are "resource
conditions that should be considered" when determining if an
extraordinary circumstance exists. 67 The new FSH guidelines give the
Forest Service more discretion when determining if an extraordinary
61 id.
62 Id. (quoting Categorical Exclusions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77,040). "Hazardous fuels
reduction involves manipulation, including combustion or removal of fuels, to reduce the
likelihood of ignition and/or to lessen potential damage to the ecosystem from intense
wild fire and to create conditions where firefighters can safely and effectively control
wildfires." Id. (quoting Categorical Exclusions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77,040-41).
63 Id. (citing Forest Service Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30 § 31.2(10) (1992)).
6Id. at 1019-20. See Forest Service Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30 § 31.2(10) (1992)).
65 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1020.
66 Id. at 1020-21 The list included: steep slopes or highly erosive
soils; threatened and endangered species or their critical habitat; flood
plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds; Congressionally designated
areas, such as wilderness, wilderness study areas, or National
Recreation Areas; inventoried roadless areas; Research Natural Areas;
and Native American Religious or cultural sites, archaeological sites, or
historic properties or areas. Id. (citing Forest Service Handbook §
1909.15, ch. 30, § 31.2(2) (1992)).
6 7 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1021 (citing Forest Service Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30, §
30.3(2) (2007)).
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circumstance exists.68 The new version of extraordinary circumstances of
the FSH was prepared because of "public and employee confusion," and
judicial rulings interpreting the previous regulations to require that
preparation of an EIS whenever a condition existed.69
B. Fuels Categorical Exclusion
Categorical exclusions are strictly limited to situations where the
impact on the environment is insignificant. 70 The threshold question for
an NEPA case is whether or not the action to be taken will "significantly
affect" the environment, thus triggering an EIS.7 1 To assess significance
properly, a programmatic cumulative impact analysis must be conducted
for the Fuels categorical exclusion.72 According to Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain v. Alexander,73 conclusory statements in the cumulative impact
analysis will not suffice because "general statements about 'possible'
effects and 'some risk' do not constitute a 'hard look' absent a justification
regarding why more definitive information could not be provided." 74
Also, if determined that this will not be a significant effect on the
environment, the agency must show that it made "reasoned decisions" and
adequately explain its decision. The Deputy Chief of the Forest Service
required a data call for the main purpose of supporting the reasonin
behind establishing the Fuels CE.76 In the case of California v. Norton,
68 Id. (citing Forest Service Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30, § 30.3(2) (2007)).
69 Id. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 54623-24; see also Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 828 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that because the elements of the extraordinary circumstances
provision were in this disjunctive, "if any of the elements is present, the Service must
prepare an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement").
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2008); see also Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189
F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir.1999).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). See Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998).
72 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1029.
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2002).
74 Id. at 1380.
7 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); see also Alaska Ctr. for
the Env't, 189 F.3d at 859; see also 40 C.F.R § 1505.1 (2005).7 6 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1026.
77 California. v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the Ninth Circuit court commented that a post-hoc examination of the data
is not sufficient because it would "frustrate the fundamental purpose of
NEPA, which is to ensure that federal agencies take a 'hard look' at the
environmental consequences of their actions, early enough so that it can
serve as a important contribution to the decision making process."78
C. 7th Circuit Decision
Heartwood, Inc v. United States Forest Service7 9 is the only other
case that has been decided on this issue. The plaintiffs in Heartwood
claim that the Forest Service violated NEPA regulations because the
Forest Service"(1) failed to conduct an EA on the proposed CE procedures
and instead issued a finding of no significant environmental impact for the
CE procedures (or alternatively, failed to conduct more extensive EIS
once it was known that a FONSI was not appropriate); (2) failed to
address or consider extraordinary circumstances before issuing the CEs;
and (3) utilizing a 'case-by-case' CE procedure in part in an attempt to
avoid NEPA requirements." 80 The Forest Service responded with the
same argument as in the instant case: it contended that when the CE rules
were established, it was not adopting a federal action which would need an
EA or EIS, but merely adopting an agency procedure. 8 '
The Southern District Court of Illinois granted summery judgment
to the Forest Service and the Seventh Circuit agreed. 82 The court relied on
the CEQ definition of "major federal action" as "'actions with effect that
may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and
responsibility... Actions include new and continuing activities... new or
revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies of procedures; and
legislative proposals."' 83 This regulation also lists several categories of
78Id. at 1175
7 Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000).
s0 d. at951.
"Id. at 953.82 Id. at 954. "The Service action creating CE's looks more like am implementing
procedure than a federal action of the type contemplated in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)." Id.
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2007)).
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major federal action.84 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs
argument that the CE's fell into one of the categories.8 5 The court stated
that CE's are agency procedures and not proposed actions which make
them categories of actions that do not necessitate an EA or EIS.86
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court's decisions in
the instant case. The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the Forest
Service did not demonstrate that it made a "reasoned decision" to
promulgate the Fuels categorical exclusion, the promulgation itself was
"arbitrary and capricious." The court also stated that "when an agency
decides to proceed with an action in the absence of an EA or EIS, the
agency must adequately explain its decision."88 The court noted that the
Forest Service failed to define the categorical exclusion with enough
specificity, thus making an inadequate record because it conducted the
data call as a post-hoc rationale for its determination to promulgate the
Fuels CE.89
The Ninth Circuit also decided that the Forest Service took the
inappropriate measure of deciding to establish a Fuels CE prior to
conducting the data call because the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service
intended for the data call to be good information for supporting a
categorical exclusion for fuels treatment, rehab and salvage. 90 The court
stated that to conduct a post-hoc examination would be going against the
purpose of NEPA, which is designed for agencies to "take a hard look" at
8 Id. The list includes "Adoption of official policy, such as rules and regulations, and
interpretations adopted pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18
(2007).
85 Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954.86 id.
87 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), a court may reverse a decision if the action is found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. at 1022
(quoting 5. U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (2000)).
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the environmental consequences of actions under consideration. 9' The
court also believed that the Forest Service failed to do the required
"scoping process" before the promulgating the Fuels CE.92 This process
would require the appropriate Forest Service officer to consider "the
cumulative impacts of connected, cumulative, and similar actions and... to
produce an EA if the proposed project may have a significant effect on the
environment." 93 The Forest Service did not dispute the argument that they
did not perform a cumulative impact analysis on the Fuels CE.94 This
court stated that performing impact analysis during the project level of the
Fuels CE is not sufficient because it does not take into consideration
impacts from the "past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future Fuels CE
projects."95
Another issue the Ninth Circuit had with the District Court
decisions was that categorical exclusions are supposed to be for situations
where there is minimal effect on the environment, 96 and the Forest Service
failed to document that the proposed action was going to have a minimal
effect on the environment.97 The main question in a NEPA case is
whether the proposed action will "significantly affect" the environment.98
The court found that the Forest Service failed on this point by not
"considering adequately the unique characteristics of the applicable
geographic areas, the degree to which effects on the quality of the
environment were controversial or the risks were unknown, the degree to
which the [categorical exclusions] might establish a precedent for future
action with significant effects or represented a decision in principle about
future considerations, the degree to which the action might affect
endangered species, and whether there existed cumulative impacts form
other related action." 99
91 Id (quotingCalifomia v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002)).
92 Id. at 1026.
93 Id. at 1027.
94 d
95 d
96 Id. See Alaska Ctr., 189 F.3d at 859; see also 40 C.F.R. §1508.4.
9 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1027.
98 id.
9 Id; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (2005).
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The court also found that the Forest Service made a mistake by not
considering "the extent to which the impact of the fuels reduction projects
on the environment was highly controversial and the risks uncertain." 00
Several state and federal agencies responded to the Fuels categorical
exclusion expressing concerns on whether it would cause significant
environmental harm and risks.o'0 The Forest Service did not meet the
burden to explain why the Fuels categorical exclusion would not have a
significant environmental harm.102
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Fuels CE lacked the requisite
specificity of the CEQ regulations.' 03  The regulations required that
categorical exclusions include "specific criteria for and identification of
those typical classes of action...which normally do not require either an
environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment
(categorical exclusions (§ 1508.4))." 104 The court found that the Fuels CE
did not have the requisite specificity that is needed to ensure that projects
taken under it can "achieve the objective of hazardous fuels reduction, but
do not individually or cumulatively inflict a significant impact." 05
Finally, the court held that the Sierra Club met the burden for
injunctive relief.106 The court noted that because environmental injury is
difficult to remedy, damages may often be permanent.107 Injunctive relief
is not always the answer, but when the proposed project is highly likely to
harm significantly the environment, injunctive relief is appropriate. 0 8
100 Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1030.
1'0 Id. at 1031. The Court noted that this was a sufficient controversy because there were
close to 39,000 comments from different agencies concerning the Fuels categorical
exclusion. Id. at 1020.
102 Id. at 1032.
103 id.
0 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2) (2005)).
105 Id. The Court stated that the Forest Service "must take specific account of the
significant impacts identified in prior hazardous fuels reduction projects and their
cumulative impacts in the design and scope of any future Fuels categorical exclusion so
that any such impacts can be prevented." Id.
11oId. at 1033.
107 id.
1os Id. (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 733 (9th Cir.
2001))
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The District Court's decision was vacated and the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case with injunction instructions to prevent the Forest
Service from implementing the Fuels CE until it has completed the proper
NEPA assessment.'0 9
V. COMMENT
Valid arguments are made on both sides of the instant case.
However, this note will discuss why there may not be enough evidence to
support the decision that the Forest Service must complete the proper
NEPA assessment before implementing the Fuels CE. One of Sierra
Club's main arguments is that NEPA applies to agency rules, and thus an
EA or EIS is required."10  However, as Forest Service argues, the
regulation does not apply to "all agenc rules, but only those that have a
significant effect on the environment."' 1 In addition, the regulations also
explicitly state that an EA or EIS is not required for categorical
exclusions, by their mere definition that they do not have a significant
effect on the human environment.112 The Federal Register Notices for the
Fuels CE also explained that CEQ "does not direct agencies to prepare a
NEPA analysis before establishing agency .procedures [such as new
categorical exclusions] that supplement the CEQ regulations for
implementing NEPA."ll 3  Because the CEQ has the authority over
interpreting NEPA and how agencies implement NEPA, it should be given
substantial deference. The CEQ examined both the procedures and
110 Brief of Appellee at 16, n. 8, Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-16989), 2006 WL 3032965.
"' Id. (emphasis added).
11240 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2005) 'Categorical Exclusion' means a category
of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment and which have been found to have
no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in
implementation of these regulations (§ 1507.3) and for which,
therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental
impact statement is required. An agency may decide in its procedures
or otherwise, to prepare environmental assessments for the reasons
stated in § 1508.9 even though it is not required to do so. Id.
"' 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,823 (June 5, 2003).
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substance of the Fuels CE and approved without finding anything that did
not conform to the statute or regulations.114  It seems clear that the
language of the regulations do not require an EA or EIS for categorical
exclusions. The basic definition of a categorical exclusion indicates that
they do not have a significant effect on the human environment. Also,
Congress has given the CEQ the authority to be in charge of how NEPA is
implemented. Thus, the analysis and decision of the CEQ regulations
should have been given due deference.
The Ninth Circuit also should have referred more to the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Heartwood v. Forest Service.15 The Seventh Circuit
examined this very same issue: if the Forest Service must prepare an EA
or EIS prior to issuing a categorical exclusion. It held that the Forest
Service was not required to do so. In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit said
that the Forest Service's action creating categorical exclusions seemed
more like implementing procedure, rather than a federal action that is
stated in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).' The CEQ defines "major federal
action" along with several categories of them including "adoption of
official policy, such as rules and regulations, and interpretations adopted
pursuant to the APA... The court stated that the creation of
categorical exclusions is an agency procedure and not proposed actions
that would require an EA or EIS. The creation of categorical exclusions
falls into a category of actions for which EA and EIS are not necessary." 8
The plaintiffs in Heartwood seem to believe that conducting an EA would
114 Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 16.
"s Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954
116 id.
"' Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2005)). Actions include new and
continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal
agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or
procedures; and legislative proposals (§ § 1506.8, 1508.17). Actions do
not include funding assistance solely in the form of general revenue
sharing funds, distributed under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. 1221 et seq., with no Federal agency control
over the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include bringing
judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions. 40
C.F.R. 1508.18(a).118Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 954.
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be the only way to determine if an EIS is necessary, however, the Seventh
Circuit pointed out that categorical exclusions, by definition, have no
significant effect on the human environment. 119 Although, this decision is
by another Circuit Court, the Ninth Circuit should have taken a more
detailed assessment of that circuit's reasoning and made a stronger
argument why it thought that decision was incorrect. The similarity in fact
patterns should have indicated the persuasive authority of the case to the
Ninth Circuit.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied on two of its own cases for
support. However, neither addresses the same legal issue as in the instant
case. In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 120 almost 60 million acres
of land were at issue. This court stated that a decision to end active
management of the area was a significant effect. But the Fuels CE in the
instant case involves a small amount of hazardous fuel reduction. It does
not change how land is managed. The court also referenced Citizens for
Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.121 That case stated that an
EA was issued for nation-wide forest planning, but nowhere did the case
state that the EA was a requirement. Thus, these two cases do not control
the issue at hand.
Two Circuits have already addressed the issue of whether or not an
EA or EIS is necessary for categorical exclusions. The CEQ regulations
appear to be clear enough to resolve this issue. However, this is an issue
that the Supreme Court should rule on to resolve the split amongst the
Circuits. If Circuits refuse to refer to one another, without consulting
rulings from other circuits, this issue will not resolve itself. However,
there will always be arguments on the other side claiming that there was
not sufficient analysis to determine that a categorical exclusion does not
have a significant effect on the human environment. But it needs to be
understood that the basic definition of a categorical exclusion states that it
does not have a significant effect on the human environment.
.. Id. "...Plaintiffs seem to suggest that conducting an EA is the only way to determine
whether or not the revised policy and procedures will significantly affect the quality of
environment. We have found nothing in the statute, the regulations or the case law to
substantiate this claim." Id.12 0 Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
121 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
What seems to be a relatively easy issue has yielded different
conclusions from the different circuits. Four separate courts have
examined this same exact issue. The South District Court of Illinois, the
Eastern District Court of California and the Seventh Circuit have all
decided that an EIS or EA/FONSI is not required for a categorical
exclusion because they, by definition, do not have a significant effect on
the human environment. However, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the
persuasive authority of the Seventh Circuit nor give adequate deference to
the Southern District Court of Illinois. By holding the opposite of the
Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit (perhaps inadvertently) created a circuit
split on the issue of whether categorical exclusions need an EA or EIS.
The best way to solve this issue would be for the Supreme Court of the
United States to rule on this matter. Such a ruling would prevent further
disagreement between the district and circuit courts.
JERRI J. ZHANG
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